Comments from William O'Keefe,
George C. Marshall Institute
Presented at the U.S. Climate Change Science Workshop
Wednesday, 5 December 2002, Marriott Wardman Park Hotel

This has been an impressive and innovative approach for seeking input into the Climate Change Strategic Plan. Jim Mahoney and his team deserve congratulations for a job well done. This workshop was not an easy undertaking but the next step of taking all of this input to turn the draft into a really policy relevant action plan is really hard work. To use a phrase that has been used often over these three days, it is a daunting challenge.

Over these three days, I have read comments and heard a few -- and I emphasize the word few -- remarks that this effort is a diversion from taking real action and that we already know all that we have to take mitigation actions. This only goes to prove the truism that no good deed goes unpunished. Jim Mahoney's challenge that the success of this effort will be measured by the degree of change reflected in the final plan is a clear indication that this is a serious effort. If the final product is not to the liking of some, that outcome should not be the result of sitting on the sidelines because of a belief that the outcome has been predetermined.

The process of developing a strategic plan provides an opportunity to improve the quality and relevance of information that drive policies and strike the right balance between risk management and preserving a healthy, robust economy. The presentations and discussions that have taken place make it absolutely clear that there is a great deal that we do not know or know well enough. Wise policy demands better information.

Given the magnitude of the challenge, systems for knowledge creation and use will be obviously pushed, perhaps to their limits. It is important, however, not to push them too hard and too far. To draw on an analogy from statistical analysis, it is one thing to torture the data until they confess; it is something else to torture them until they confess to anything. A healthy dose of pragmatism as well as humility by those who implement and manage the plan will serve them well as they proceed.

In many of the breakout sessions that I attended, the value of an iterative process of planning and decision making was stressed. That is the proven approach to decision making under conditions of uncertainty. The recognition of that approach for this initiative was reassuring as was the clear recognition of the value of small steps, of learning from experience and the need for a feedback loop so that actions can be adjusted to new information.

The agenda of possible actions identified in the plan almost certainly exceed the resources that are or likely to be available to implement them. Resource constraints make priority setting and a rational sequencing of research and analyses even more crucial than they otherwise would be. So I urge that a high priority be given to setting the priority setting criteria and to making sure that they are used. In addition to the criteria identified in the draft, I want to suggest three others -- the potential impact of a project, the probability of success and how policy makers will use the information. Yesterday, one of my co-panelists who is from the public health field mentioned several other factors that apply to her field. I believe that they are worth repeating -- awareness of a problem, understanding its causes, a sense that the problem matters, a capacity to exercise control, and political will to act. With climate change, we think that there may be a problem but we are a long way from understanding the causes and what we can do about them.

During the discussions, there were repeated references to the need to give a high priority to aerosols, carbon sources and sinks and climate sensitivity. I agree with that those are important but there are other factors that deserve equal consideration. These include natural variability, climate variability, clouds, water vapor, solar irradiance, chaotic elements of the climate system and the issue of the level of confidence with which science can confirm that climate changes that have occurred are due to human influence.

Better understanding of these factors is critical to understanding the warming of the past century and recent decades. But in my judgment, the most important actions are the global climate observing system described by Admiral Lautenbacher described yesterday and the production of high quality observational data.

One danger that needs to be kept in mind is that the focus on policy relevant research could crowd our needed long-term investments in basic research. Investing in basic research builds intellectual and scientific capacity that is needed long term for this issue as well as the continued advancement of knowledge and the benefits that flow from it.

In the plan and in the discussions over these three days there have been repeated references to the "climate program". But, we all know that this is not a program as the term is normally used. It is a collection of activities that are loosely coordinated. The Federal system limits flexibility, clear accountability and the type of controls exercised in the private sector. That is a fact of life and it is not going to change, at least any time soon. But that is not a reason for an on-going effort to slowly create a real program and a management process to implement it effectively. Doing a little bit better each year is not dramatic but it is a reasonable goal.

There is one important management issue that needs immediate attention. It is the unintended consequence of cohesion and consensus. These qualities, which contribute to efficiency, can have the down side of shutting out negative information and the full vetting of alternatives. Science advances by debate, controversy and skepticism. Unfortunately, in the climate arena, skepticism has been turned into a vice instead of a virtue. This initiative will be much more valuable if ways can be found to make sure that there is creative tension in the process so that competing ideas, analyses and theories are not prematurely shut down. The Department of Defense does this by use of the "Red-Team" concept and the activities of the Office of Net Threat Assessment. Something similar is needed for the climate issue.

My final point deals with clarity of communication. Several panelists have observed that the draft plan is obscure, difficult to understand and in some places contradictory. That may be the result of needing organizational or committee consensus or it could be the result of masking what isn't fully comprehended. It is impossible to be wholly clear on what isn't well understood. Since clarity of expression exposes flaws in thought, there should be a very high premium placed on clear communication.

To the extent that the drive for consensus makes that difficult, give consensus a lower priority. At least twice during this workshop, conclusions from the 2001 National Academy Executive Summary on climate change have been quoted. They are a perfect example, in my opinion, of how a consensus driven process can lead to obscurity and logical inconsistency.

It simply defies logic to say that changes observed over recent decades are "likely mostly due to human activities" and then state that "some significant part of these changes" could be due to natural variability, especially when the report describes the great uncertainties associated with key climate processes. Policy makers will be better served if they know where there is legitimate consensus and where there are major disagreements.

Clarity in communication could begin by articulating what is known about human influence, what is unknown about the climate system but perhaps knowable in a reasonable time with additional research, what may be unknowable in any reasonable time period, what information is the most important for near term policy decisions and why certain uncertainties are important for policy making.